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Next-stage Judaism and Zionism: An Emergent Middle East

The Best of Authentic Zionism

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Originally uploaded by Hadar.

The Hebrew grafiti says {Eyn Aravim eyn homos} No Arabs, no hummus. As this humorous grafiti suggests, the Arabic cultural presence in Israel is an integral part of Israeli society.

Below is the text of a speech I delivered this past spring. I've decided to start posting some of my papers and articles here in addition to the usual posts.

It is often difficult to uncover the truth when one is dealing with such hotly contested topics as peace and war. Nowhere is this more true than in Israel/Palestine. It is frequently hard to even define the two opposing groups in this conflict. Such complexities as the sizable Arab population with Israeli citizenship, the view of Zionism as heresy by many of the ultra-orthodox Jews, and the growing numbers of anti-Zionist Jewish Israelis make the picture of two warring peoples much more blurry and confused upon closer examination. Perhaps the closest approximation of a definition of the opposing sides would be Zionism versus anti-Zionism. However, this definition is disorienting to many passive observers who may be unaware of the actual meaning of the term Zionism. This division, like the others, is shown to be false after closer consideration. Zionism is not racism, as the increasingly popular slogan Zionism equals racism would suggest, nor is it a messianic national liberation movement, such as that supported by branches of conservative Christianity and the relatively few messianic Jewish settlers.

What Zionism used to mean is very different from what it has come to mean today. Zionism is erroneously defined as Jewish nationalism that seeks to establish and maintain a Jewish nation-state modeled after the various European ethnic nation-states of the 19th and 20th centuries. The major challenge faced by Jewish nationalists of this variety was that Jews were not a majority in any significant territory. In order to establish a nation-state, they would first have to occupy lands already inhabited by others. This was and continues to be a major source of conflict which, in this case, has led to the occupation of Palestinian lands and the creation of millions of Palestinian refugees. Of course there are some Israelis who support a more moderate form of statist nationalism, honestly attempting to make an equitable and lasting peace with the Palestinians. Such views are held by many members of the social-democratic political parties Havodah and Yachad. However, there are also those who envision a more aggressive, expansionist approach to Jewish nationalism, such as the members of the Gush Emunim settlers' movement and Ariel Sharon's ruling right-wing Likud party.

It is important not to single out Israel in a world filled with many much larger conflicts, and criminals that receive very little attention from would-be critics, but rather to remember that this is a conflict involving about 12 million people over a piece of land smaller than Vancouver Island.

However, we must not be afraid to criticize unjust actions and dream of what could be. My dream for the Israelis, and for the Palestinians is neither a one-state solution, nor a two-state solution of any type. I reject all nation-states, and all statist nationalisms, from the rather dovish variants to the more militaristic varieties. I envision a cooperative society based upon the integration of all segments of the population between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. Many of you may not understand what I mean, or may view this as a total repudiation of Zionism. In reality this vision of cooperation would have been accepted within the Zionist mainstream about 70 years ago.

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Tree II Beta
Originally uploaded by Beny Shlevich

Gaza Pullout

Although it is too early to be able to assess the full implications of the Gaza pullout, and many issues are still unresolved, such as border crossing and what form the Palestinian response to what has just happened will take, now that the evacuation is done it is possible to think realistically about a post-settler Gaza. While reading last week's edition of The Economist I saw some interesting maps in the feature article, Goodbye to Gaza which was written before the pullout. The maps show the settlements that lay beyond the 1967 borders, and divides them into four categories based on what types of settlers they are occupied by. The categories are: mainly economic/secularly motivated, moderate religious, Haredi, and extremist religious. Many of the settlers want what everyone wants: simply a better, more peaceful life.

Gaza
Mainly economic/secular: 5
Moderate: 13
Haredi: 0
Extremist: 0

West Bank
Mainly economic/secular: 40
Moderate: 65
Haredi: 2
Extremist: 5

What I see here is something that does not surprise me, but is very interesting. Many Israeli settlers chose to live beyond the borders for economic and quality of life reasons. Many are disenchanted by Israeli society and wish to make something better, safer for their children, or simply more spacious in Palestinian lands. I do not see the acceptance of this task to be at all unjust or unreasonable, but would rather view it as the flip-side of the trend of many Palestinians stating that they want Israeli citizenship (I saw this in a poll in Ha'aretz months ago). While I believe that many of the settlements were built on land acquired by unjust or unfair means, I agree with the underlying aims of the secular and moderate settlers.

It is a tragedy that states, national/religious politics and wars have forestalled the development of both the Palestinians and the Israelis. Not only are Israelis and Palestinians joined at the hip by geography, environment and economy, but they share many of the same cultural concerns and have much to offer to one another. This is something that Martin Buber recognized years ago: that Zionism includes the "de-Europeanization" of Ashkenazim and the "modernization" of the Palestinians. Many Israelis, and particularly the settlers, desire to live more land-based Middle Eastern lives, and many Palestinians desire the best modernity has to offer, democracy, education, recreation and entertainment. By no means should each side abandon its own particulars all together and adopt those of the other, but by reaching a middle ground both cultures will no longer stand on one leg and both will be fully Middle Eastern and fully modern.

This is the tragedy that must be escaped: each has what the other wants and neither are trusting enough to share. Once the two peoples allow for cultural exchange we may be able to build some trust, paving the way for greater material and economic exchange, eventually leading to a binational renaissance and a sharing of the land. Only then will Israelis be able to walk beyond the green-line with full integrity and Palestinians be able to share in modern intellectual society with neither shame nor alienation.

A Binational Histadrut?

According to Bernard Avishai, prior to the War of Independence --in 1947-- 250,000 Palestinians left Palestine without being forced out (others left under duress, but I don't have reason to doubt Avishai's numbers regarding those who were not forced out), mostly from the areas designated for a Jewish state in the 1947 UN partition plan. They were not leaving as a voluntary population transfer, but rather sought to return home once the impending war had passed. The usual Israeli hasbarah, or "explanation" of this occurance is that the all the Palestinians who left did so of their own accord and that the Zionists did not expel anyone at all. In places like Jaffa, Ramle, Lod (and Deir Yassin at the hands of Irgun gunmen) this was clearly not true. Another possible conclusion that can be drawn from this mass flight is that the fellahin were a sensible people, desiring life for themselves and their families over ideological anti-Zionism or any form of Arab nationalism. What does this mean? First off, that the Yishuv's attempts to negotiate with Abdullah, the Mufti or any other Arab leaders over the Palestinian people were wrong-headed. Most of these leaders were selected by the British, and as in the case of the Mufti were chosen from hard-line groups intentionally. We should not point to the Mufti as the representation of the will of the Palestinian people. But how could the Yishuv's leaders have sought to reach out to the Palestinians? What common cause could they share? Weren't they just doomed to fight one another all along anyway?

The answers are: 1) economics 2) land redistribution 3) no.

The Histadrut, the Yishuv's shadow government/labor union, was organized along the principle that conflict with the Arabs would best be avoided by ignoring them. They sought to encourage Jews to only hire other Jews. This may seems an unreasonable or racist measure at first. However, its intention was fairly humane. It sought to simultaneously keep the new Jewish immigrants together so that they could learn Modern Hebrew and to avoid exploiting the Arabs in a colonial manner. Rather than exploiting their labor (as was the model of European colonialism) they sought to avoid contact all together (saying that they did not want ethnic conflict along the same lines as class conflict). Undoubtedly demographics too were at least part of the program; by buying their lands and depriving them of work the Zionists knew they were forcing them to leave the country or at least the parts of it under the Yishuv's control. However, beyond these rather minor points about potential moral problems with the policy, there lies a much more significant concern: the Labor Zionist economic policy was not entirely self-contained from the Palestinian economy. Land purchasing policies were designed to aquire lands from absentee landlords and left the peasants that worked the land without land or payment. Additionally Histadrut Hebrew labor practices in hiring left them without jobs. Combined, such an economic policy inadvertantly destroyed the already stagnant Palestinian economy, putting cash in the pockets of the effendis/landlords while taking the fellah's very livelihood.

In light of the fact that the tax and landlord arrangements before didn't leave the fellahin any better off, and that the Palestinian standard of living rose drasticly during those years, why should we care? How is this the concern of the Zionists?

Peace with the Palestinians could only have been maintained/achieved by making this our concern. Zionism's health is dependent upon peace.

What economic program could have been employed to benefit the fellahin? Inclusion in the Histadrut and a joint share in the socialized land (Professor Himadeh and other like-minded intellectuals could have been called upon to organize a binational labor movement). (Now of course the Zionists were defensive of their immigrants, wanting them to have a chance to become Israeli Hebrew-speakers before being exposed to close contact witht the Arabs. For this reason the native-born members of the Yishuv should have been the only ones deployed to work in daily contact with the Arabs, leaving the olim to have at least a few years in Jewish collectives to learn the language on their own.) Essentially this amounts to a class war of the halutz-fellah working-class vs. the effendi-Rothschild upper-class. At the precise tactical moment of strength the (binational) Histadrut could have claimed ownership of all Arab estates, unclaimed lands, and non-Labor Zionist tracts. Inevitably there would need to be a strong nonviolent resistance to British attempts to defend the absentee propertied class's ownership rights. But if successful, such a resistance could unite the Jews and Palestinians against the foreign elites, and challenge the British presence there.

Such an economic program is not simply justified by leftist economic theories, but was a practical step necessary to dismantle the oppresive Palestinian economic situation and bring autonomy to the members of the Yishuv from foreign patrons and bodies. Most importantly it is a pragmatic program to maintain peace, and hence Zionism as well. If such a program were connected to a clearly stated Zionist goal regarding territoritorial compromise (preferably only an autonomous zone in the Tel Aviv region), the fellahin would have had plenty of reason to not only not fight the Yishuv, but feel close to it.

Timing would have been the key to making it work, toing the line with the British, Western donors, and effendis until organization was sufficient to topple foreign paternalistic and exploitative influences from the land.

Eventually I hope to post here what steps could be taken at present to continue such a line of thinking.

Yeridah: Highest Form of Zionism

New Zionist article about yordim.

I know that this is idealistic and far off.

Background: To "make aliyah" means "to ascend" in Hebrew. This phrase is frequently used to describe the process by which a Jew from the Diaspora becomes an Israeli. Such an immigrant is called an oley. To "make yeridah" means "to descend," and is used to describe both moral lapse and emigration from Israel. One who makes yeridah is called a yorod. Mainstream Zionism considers aliyah to be an integral part of Zionism, and is valued in the demographic war with the Arabs. Making yeridah is discouraged and considered an unpatriotic betrayal of Zionism.

In recent years many of the young, intelligent and motivated Israelis have been making yeridah, leaving Israel for the USA, Canada and Germany, seeking professional/educational opportunities, cultural experiences, the thrill of the big city, safety from terrorist attacks and distance from "the situation." Many yordim don't consider themselves to be anti-Zionist or unpatriotic. They carry their Israeliness with them and feel as if they are liberated from Diaspora oppression by their state of mind regardless of the fact that they do not live in Israel. Most Israelis, and yordim in particular, are not religious. Their sense of Jewishness is secular and very refreshing, reinvigorating the cultural life of the Diasporic Jewish communities with which they come into contact. I like the yordim, and feel that their presence in the American Jewish communities is very valuable.

Perhaps if the Israeli government weren't so absorbed in HaMatsav, "the conflict," it would be able to see this, encouraging young Israelis to make yeridah to bring the "new jew" mentality to the Diaspora. They are casual, argumentative, energetic, intelligent and knowledgeable about practical things, combining Germanic technical competance, Mediterranean verve, and a Middle Eastern sense of historical context and purpose.

Possible Vision: Having Israel as a cultural base from which to spread this way of being Jewish would be in keeping with Cultural Zionism, maintaining a small Israeli population (maybe 1-2 million) to support academic and artistic institutions along with the kibbutzim (which I wish weren't dying). Such a place would not necesitate Israeli political control, only equal rights and access to visit, live in and travel across the land. Tel Aviv would be a major Jewish city. Jerusalem would continue to be home to the Haredi orthodox. Jewish college students from around the world would come here to study, and some would make aliyah, and then yeridah to carry the values back to the Diaspora.

[In Haifa maybe a new identity could be formed. Palestinians and Israelis could intermingle to make a new sabra identity. Sabra means cactus, and is used to describe native-born Israelis. I think it should be applied to Palestinians as well. No longer Jews, Arabs, Palestinians, Israelis, Muslims, Christians, or Druze, the people of Haifa and the Galilee could all become sabrot, speaking a mixed Hebrew-Arabic language, intermarrying until they can't be untangled. Seeing as the land is small and short of water, it may be best for many of the Palestinian refugees to join in this yeridah movement. While I can now only clearly see this applying to Israeli Jews, it may some day be that there could be "new sabrot" in Israel/Palestine and the Diaspora who could also follow this aliyah-yeridah formula.]

Yeridah is the highest manifestation of Cultural Zionism.

Now I have the problem of how I could someday make aliyah for the purpose of making yeridah. I have a feeling that it would be very difficult to become an Israeli as a conscientious objector. It would be hard to become a citizen without serving in the military or paying taxes that are used for the fighting (militarism is the single biggest problem with the Israeli culture; I'd have to be careful to make sure they don't sink their hooks into me and militarize me or dissuade me from making yeridah). There may be ways around it though. I may have to settle for continually renewing visas for as long as it takes for me to feel that I have Israelified myself well enough to make yeridah. Although, I don't know if I'll want to return to the USA, if the wars are still going on, and I'd have to pay taxes to that. I might go to Spain or Canada. If that all works out, there is proposed legislation that would allow me to vote in Israeli elections even as a yorod.

Toward a Materialist Explanation of the Decline of the Middle East

A few years back I read Bernard Lewis's What Went Wrong?. While it is a good book, I have come to view it as incomplete, and overall it seems to skirt any conclusive answer to its own question. So what did go wrong?

Zoom out. Before considering why the region declined relative to Europe we must first understand how it came to a position of dominance in the first place.

Geography: Arable land is limited in the Middle East. The population lived where food and water were accessible, causing them to live in closer proximity to one another and form urban centers relatively early. As a result the economic activity was more focused on trades, crafts and trade than agriculture. This economic activity of the urban centers brought advancement in education, culture and technology. The Mediterranean as a whole developed similarly. Some areas like Egypt had large enough arable regions to support an economic system more akin to that of pre-industrial Europe.

In Europe on the other hand, food, water and land were less restricted in its early history. Thus the population was spread more thinly in many small villages rather than large cities. The economic activity was primarily agricultural, requiring only two major classes: landlords and serfs/peasants. In such a setting there is no need for education, technology (such as for aqueducts). Early European culture, especially in the north, was more primitive than that of the Middle East.

However, as agricultural output outran population growth in the 18th and 19th centuries, the primary economic activity of the continent was no longer profitable, and Europeans began rapid industrialization, drawing upon the impoverished peasant class for the new proletarian labor to which craftsmen were unwilling to be subjugated. The European Old Middle Class (artisans) became useless and either fell down into the proletariat or went up into the New Middle Class (Jews were heavily represented in the Old Middle Class and may have been more strongly targetted for race-based discrimination and assault during this period in order to lessen the intense pressures being exerted on the artisan class gentiles). Through this process of proletarianization and rapid industrialization of a new urban economy, Europe was able to generate immense wealth at the expense of the first generations of proletarians. However, following the birth-pains of the new economy, Europe entered a powerful period of industrial maturity and eventually shifted into what may now be called a post-industrial economy. The early industrial period was also marked by emigration due to unemployment during the transition that resulted from agricultural over-production.

In the Middle East there was less income inequality, and a wider variety of economic classes. There was no massive peasant class to work in the factories. There was no agricultural over-production to spark emigration and industrialization. The artisans were in no way going to self-proletarianize without the strong pressures that were present in Europe. At present the Middle Eastern economic systems cannot compete with those of the West, nor can they block out western hegemony--though they could be self-sustaining in theory, and in fact they were for centuries. In Yemen and elsewhere parts of this old economy still exist.

The problem that continues to face the Middle East is how to cope with new economic situations. Should the region undergo total industrialization as was done in Europe? Does it have to be so horrible as it was there? Is there a way to return to an artisan economy? This same problem is the root of Zionism and is what Jews sought to escape by coming to the Middle East. The challenge is still there, and must be faced by Jews and Arabs alike.

Professor Said B. Himadeh

In reading Bernard Avishai's book The Tragedy of Zionism I came across a particularly interesting section starting on p. 145, in which he discusses and quotes the 1930's Arab economist and social scientist, Professor Said B. Himadeh of the American University in Beirut, authour of The Economic Organization of Palestine, in which he carries out an extensive study of Labor Zionism. I am awed by Himadeh's ability to stand in the Zionists' shoes, viewing them with what Avishai calls "nervous admiration," understanding their cause while knowing what it means for the Arabs of Palestine. While Avishai's purpose in this section seems somewhat partisan, on the whole the book is very much to my liking.

I wanted to know if anyone has any further information about Himadeh. I have a feeling that the miltarist pan-Arabism of Nasser and the likes may mask something much more valuable and humane, much in the same way that an outsider (and even some insiders) might misunderstand Zionism's true purpose. If anyone is particularly knowledgeable about branches of Arab nationalism or Himadeh, I'd be most glad to hear from them. I would have a particular interest in contacting Arabs who advocate alternative forms of Arabism that may be roughly equivalent to the more enlightened aspects of Cultural and Labor Zionism (what I like to term Authentic Zionism).

What most interests me about Authentic Zionism is not so much the pure nationalism as the entire worldview that comes along with it: proactivity, humanism, socialism, ideological synthesis through dialectics, communitarianism, cultural education, participatory democracy... I believe that if I knew more about Arab nationalism I would be able to sketch out a combined movement that could allow for Authentic Zionism and Arabism to work together for their mutual advantage, perhaps wih the help of an Arab who stands relative to their national movements as I stand to my own. Politically Israelis should be able to retain a majority in Tel Aviv for the forseeable future, and Palestinians should likewise have a small region of exclusive control, leaving most of the land open for cultural synthesis.


As a long-term goal I hope to see perhaps the development of either a third nationalism alongside the other two, or subsuming the other two. Alternatively it could simply form a common, loose identity umbrella under which Zionism and Arabism may retain full autonomy. I want a neo-canaanist or perhaps pan-semitic movement. Eventually I think there should be a Hebrew-Arabic language formed through a combination of self-conscious acts such as those that made Modern Hebrew, and more organic methods of creolization through integrating schools at the lower levels and teaching children in both Arabic and Hebrew equally so that they will naturally start mixing the two. As previously mentioned, I do not think intermarriage would not be a threat to either national group because the kids would pick simply what they think is more interesting. Similarly I do not think that Jewish or Palestinian identities would die out because the conservative religious communities would long resist such close intermingling.